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INTRODUCTION
This brief is submitted by Appellee and Cross-Appellant Wardley Corporation
(hereinafter "Wardley") in reply to the response of Appellant Grant Welsh (hereinafter
"Welsh") on the issues presented by Wardley's cross-appeal relating to the trial court's denial
of Wardley's attorney's fees. The jurisdiction, issues on cross-appeal, determinative statutes
and authority, statement of the case and statement of facts have all been previously set forth
in Wardley's Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, currently on file herein, and are
incorporated herein by this reference.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Contract at issue herein provides, "In any action arising out of this contract, the
prevailing party should be awarded its attorney's fees." As this is an action arising out of the
contract, and Wardley is the prevailing party, it follows that Wardley should properly be
awarded its attorney's fees based upon this unambiguous contractual provision. The trial
court, however, determined that the Contract was not clear on whether Wardley, as a named
third-party beneficiary, could recover under this provision. Since the rights of a third-party
beneficiary are determined by the intentions of the contracting parties, the trial court sought
to determine those intentions.
After determining that the Contract was not clear, the court further determined that
no extrinsic evidence had been produced at trial regarding the parties' intentions as to
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Wardley's recovery of attorney's fees. Welsh claims that evidence of intent was provided
by a brief segment of his trial testimony wherein he stated that he and Leon Peterson, the
other signatory party to the Contract, never had any conversations in relation to the
applicability of the attorney's fee provision to Wardley. Non-existent conversations,
however, do not provide evidence of intent. Since no extrinsic evidence of the parties'
intentions were produced at trial, well-established contract law requires that the Contract be
construed against Welsh as a drafter of the contract. Further, other neighboring jurisdictions
have allowed recovery of attorney's fees by a third-party beneficiary of a contract under a
similar contractual provision.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE CONTRACT, BY ITS CLEAR TERMS, PROVIDES FOR THE RECOVERY
OF ATTORNEYS' FEES BY THE PREVAILING PARTY IN AN ACTION
ARISING OUT OF THE CONTRACT
The contract which is the subject hereof contains the following provision: "In any
action arising out of this contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees." (R. at 4.) In determining whether this provision only applies to
signatory parties to the Contract, it is helpful to consider other provisions of the Contract.
Notably, the signatory parties are repeatedly referred to throughout the Contract as "Buyer"
and "Seller." Yet, the provision relating to attorney's fees makes no reference to the Buyer
74570. WA770.111
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and Seller, which easily could have been done, as evidenced by numerous other provisions
in which such a distinction is made. Further, the Contract itself does not limit recovery of
attorneys' fees to issues involving the Buyer and Seller. Rather, the contract entitles the
prevailing party in any action arising out of the contract to its attorneys' fees and costs.
Wardley is a prevailing party, this is an action arising out of the Contract, and Wardley is
entitled to its attorney's fees herein. Construing the contract to limit attorneys' fees only to
the signatory parties not only is contrary to the express contract wording itself but, also, adds
provisions and limitations to the Contract which were not included by the contracting parties.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE PARTIES PRODUCED
NO EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE ON THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES RELATING
TO THE ATTORNEYS' FEE PROVISION
Following the trial, the Court issued Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, which were drafted by the Court itself and which address the sole issue of the
application of the contract's attorney's fee provision to Wardley as a named third-party
beneficiary. (R. at 477-78.) The Court found, "There was no evidence at the trial on the
application of the attorney's fee provision to the plaintiff." (R. at 478.) Welsh's Reply Brief
claims that such a finding was erroneous based upon a brief segment of Welsh's trial
testimony. Examination of this testimony, however, reveals that the testimony provides no
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evidence whatsoever of the parties' intentions relating to attorney's fees. The trial testimony
is as follows:
Q.

Grant, when you signed Defendant's Exhibit 2, the contract
(unintelligible) with Leon Peterson, before you signed that, the very
next meeting that you had with him, did you and he have any
conversation about whether or not either one of you had intended that
Wardley get attorneys fees if they had to sue for their commission?

A.

No discussion whatsoever.

Q.

. . . [D]id you have any conversation with Mr. Peterson at any time
other than the time you signed the agreement concerning whether or not
Wardley would have an entitlement to attorneys fees if they didn't get
their commission?

A.

No.

Q.

Was it ever your intent in signing that agreement that if Wardley didn't
get their attorneys fees they would be able to collect-or didn't get their
commission, they would be able to collect-

A.

No.

(R. 717-19).
Significantly, the first and second questions constitute no evidence of the contracting
parties' intent as to attorneys' fees to a third-party beneficiary. To the contrary, this
testimony merely states that the parties never discussed their intentions relating to this
contractual provision, providing no evidence either way on this issue. Non-existent
conversations provide no evidence of intent. It follows that the court must take the next step,
74570.WA770.111
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beyond a consideration of extrinsic evidence, to interpret the contract. As set forth below,
under well-established contract law, the next step to be taken by the Court is to construe the
contract against its drafter. See, Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson. 886 P.2d 61,64 (Utah
App. 1994).
The third question asked in this segment of testimony is incomplete. Even with the
after-the-fact, self-serving statement, Welsh tried to second guess the question being asked
by his attorney and did not even let him finish the question, resulting in a meaningless
question without any probative value as to the parties' intentions. Significantly, this small
segment of testimony is the only "evidence" that Welsh points to as to the parties' intentions.
This excerpt, though, does not clarify or in any way evidence the parties' intent of the parties
as to Wardley's attorneys' fees.
In interpreting a contract, the court first looks to the "four corners of the agreement
to determine the intentions of the parties. The use of extrinsic evidence is permitted only if
the document appears to incompletely express the parties' agreement or if it is ambiguous in
expressing that agreement." Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382,
1385 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted.) Even if the Court properly determined that the contract
was ambiguous on the issue of awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing third-party
beneficiary, the parties' intentions were not clarified by extrinsic evidence, and accordingly,
the court must interpret the contract against Welsh as the drafter "If a contract is ambiguous,
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it will be construed against the drafter if extrinsic evidence fails to clarify the intent of the
parties." Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson. 886 P.2d 61, 64 (Utah App. 1994); see also,
Wilburn v. Interstate Elec. 748 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1988).
III.
THE CONTRACT SHOULD PROPERLY BE CONSTRUED
AGAINST WELSH AS THE DRAFTER
When the trial court was unable to determine the parties' intent from extrinsic
evidence, the Contract, and specifically the provision relating to attorneys' fees, should have
been strictly construed against Grant Welsh as drafter of that Contract. I&. Although Welsh
argues that the Contract was a form contract and, therefore, he was not the drafter of that
instrument, this position is contrary to well-established contract law. "Form contracts are to
be construed against the furnishing party." Craig Taylor Equipment v. Pettibone Corp.. 659
P.2d 594,597 (Alaska 1983). "Any ambiguity in a written contract is to be construed against
the party who prepared the agreement or selected the language used." Caldwell v.
Consolidated Realty & Mgmt Co., 668 P.2d 284, 286 (Nev. 1983). (Emphasis added.)
Where a party has used a form contract, the contract shall be strictly construed against that
party as the author of the agreement. Id As Welsh himself alleges in his Reply Brief, "[T]he
ambiguous language concerning the right of a party to recover attorneys fees was not drafted
by Welsh at all. It was part of the printed form used by both Welsh and Leon Peterson in
framing the transaction." (Reply Brief of Appellant at p. 19.) (Emphasis added.) Welsh
74570 WA770 111
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and Peterson decided to use this printed form with its accompanying language, and
accordingly, in a dispute between Welsh and Wardley, in which Wardley had no say in the
use of the form portion of the Contract or any modification made thereto, the Contract should
properly be construed against Welsh.
A further reason the contract should be construed against Welsh is that he was a
signatory to the contract, having opportunity to review, modify and clarify any contract
provisions before signing. Welsh was in fact the drafter, in the most traditional sense, of
Addendum #1 and specifically paragraph 12 of that Addendum which gave rights under the
Contract to Wardley, yet Welsh did not clarify the application of the other terms of the
Contract, such as the attorney's fee provision, to Wardley. (R. at 249, 277, and 647.)
Notably, Welsh did modify terms of the Contract by changes made in the Addendum. For
example, in paragraph 9 of the Addendum, Welsh added, "All conditions herein shall survive
closing and settlement," which changed the printed abrogation provisions in paragraph 19
of the Contract. (R. at 327-28.) Welsh had obviously considered all of the terms of the
Contract and modified those terms which did not fully express the parties' intent. He made
no mention or modification of the broad attorney's fee language. Thus, if an ambiguity
exists, it should be construed against Welsh, as a drafter of the Contract.
In his Reply Brief, Welsh improperly alleges that Wardley had some duty to marshall
the evidence relating to the attorney's fee issue. Welsh does not fully understand the
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operation of this burden. Significantly, the trial court itself determined, and specifically held,
"There was no evidence at the trial on the application of the attorney's fee provision to the
plaintiff." (Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. at 477-78.) Wardley
agrees with this finding. A party is required to marshall evidence as follows:
To successfully challenge a trial court's factual finding, "[a]n appellant
must marshall the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support
as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly
erroneous."
Jacobs v. Hafen. 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah App. 1994), quoting In re Estate of Bartel 776
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); Estate of Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). (Emphasis
added.) Since Wardley agrees with and does not challenge thatfinding,there exists no duty
to marshall such evidence in that regard. Wardley's challenge to the Court's attorneys' fees
determination goes to legal, rather than factual, issues. See, Interwest Construction v.
Palmer. 923 P.2d 1350, 1358 (Utah 1996). Wardley challenges the Court's determination
that the Contract was ambiguous and also its failure to construe the Contract against the
Welsh as drafter of the Contract after finding that no extrinsic evidence on attorney's fees
was produced at trial.
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IV.
OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE PROPERLY AWARDED
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES
As fully set forth in Wardley's Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, currently on
file herein, although Utah has not specifically addressed the issued of whether a litigant who
was not a signatory to a contract can recover attorney's fees and costs in an action based
upon the contract, other adjoining neighboring jurisdictions have considered this issue and
have allowed recovery of attorney's fees by a prevailing litigant who was not a signatory
party to the contract. See National Indemnity Co. v. St. Paul Insurance Companies, 724 P.2d
578, 581 (Ariz. App. 1985); Golden West Insulation v. Stardust Investment Corp.. 615 P.2d
1048 (Or. App. 1980). In both of these cases attorney's fees were awarded to a noncontracting party based upon the contract and State statute providing for recovery of
attorneys fees by a prevailing party if the contract provided for attorney's fees to be awarded
to at least one party. (The language of the statutes is set forth in Wardley's Brief of Appellee
and Cross-Appellant and, therefore, is not repeated herein.)
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-27-56.5, although not verbatim to the statutes referenced in

these cases, similarly provides for recovery of attorney's fees by a prevailing party when the
contract provides for attorney's fees to at least one of the parties in the action, as follows:
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note,
74570.WA770.111
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written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's
fees.
The Contract undisputedly provides for recovery of attorneys fees by at least one party in an
action arising out of the Contract. Wardley is entitled to recover its attorney's fees herein not
only due to the unambiguous language of the Contract, but also by operation of UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-27-56.5
In his Reply Brief, Welsh argues that any claim to recovery Wardley may have under
the statute is barred since such a statutory claim was not raised in the Complaint. Wardley's
claim for attorney's fees, however, is rooted in the Contract itself, which, if not adequate to
provide for Wardley's attorney's fees based upon its terms alone, can still be properly
extended by operation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.5 to allow such recovery by Wardley.
Without the attorney's fee provision of the Contract, Wardley would have no basis to claim
its attorney's fees, evidencing that Wardley's claim for attorneys' fees was properly set forth
in the pleadings based upon the Contract.
//
//
//
//
//
//
74570.WA770.111

CONCLUSION
For the reason set forth herein, as well as for the reasons previously set forth in
Wardley's Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, currently on file herein, Wardley
respectfully requests that the trial court's decision denying Wardley its attorneys' fees be
reversed.
DATED this ^ 1

day of November, 1997

Neil R. Sabin
Annette F. Sorensen
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
Cross-Appellant Wardley Corporation
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